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Abstract:  
 
Prior research on financial analysts’ consensus earnings forecast errors has tended to 
explore either incentives-based or inefficient information use-based explanations for the 
properties of the analysts’ forecast errors. This has limited our understanding of financial 
analysts’ expectation formation process as incentives and cognitive biases are likely to 
simultaneously affect the properties of the analysts’ consensus forecast errors. Our main 
contribution is in separating these two effects. In particular, using consensus quarterly earnings 
forecast data, we document that analysts have asymmetric loss function and that they do not fully 
use information about past earnings and forecast errors in minimizing their expected loss.  
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Introduction 
 
Financial analysts are an important information intermediary whose forecasts influence 
market’s expectations and are often used as a proxy for the unobservable market’s expectations. 
Thus, many studies examine the properties of analysts’ forecasts to draw inferences about analyst 
incentives and the extent to which analysts use information efficiently. Inferences about analysts’ 
incentives are typically based on an examination of mean or median forecast errors. Inferences 
about information use on the other hand are based on OLS or LAD regressions of forecast errors 
on publicly available information.  
These approaches have several important limitations. First, the mean and the median 
forecast errors are likely to be affected by how analysts use information, which results in 
ambiguous inferences about incentives. Second, inferences about how analysts use information 
based on OLS or LAD regressions in turn depend on the assumption that analysts have a 
symmetric quadratic or a symmetric linear loss function.  If this assumption is empirically 
invalid, then we can wrongly reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis that analysts use 
information efficiently (Ellliott et al., 2004a, 2004b). 
We attempt to make inferences about incentives and information use less ambiguous by 
analyzing forecast data with the help of a simple model of forecasting behavior. We view this 
model mainly as a useful tool to separate incentives from information use rather than as a true 
depiction of analyst incentives. 
We represent financial analysts’ incentives by either a quadratic or a linear loss function 
with a single unknown parameter, α, capturing the amount of asymmetry in the loss function.1 
                                                 
1 For brevity, we will often say that we assume a quadratic or a linear loss function. What we always mean is that we 
assume a quadratic or a linear loss function with an unknown single parameter capturing the amount of asymmetry 
in the loss function. The quadratic loss function differs from the linear loss function only in that costs are attached to 
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For example, an α of 0.75 (0.25) means that the cost of a positive forecast error is three times as 
high (low) as the cost of a negative forecast error, or that analysts have incentives to issue 
optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts. A parameter of 0.5 represents the case of symmetry. In 
addition to being simple, this functional form nests the traditional symmetric linear and quadratic 
loss functions (Basu and Markov, 2004). 
An optimizing forecaster would use all available information to issue a forecast that 
would minimize her expected loss. We use the first-order conditions from this minimization 
problem to estimate the unknown loss function parameter that is most consistent with the data. 
The loss function parameter is identified even if analysts do not use information efficiently, 
which allows us to make inferences about incentives without assuming efficient information use. 
Our measure of efficient information use (forecast optimality) is Hansen’s J-statistic, 
which checks how well the first-order conditions are satisfied.2 In contrast to prior studies’ 
measures of information use, our measure is valid even if the loss function is not symmetric. 
We recover the asymmetry parameter of the analysts’ loss function from quarterly 
earnings forecasts data and assess the extent to which analysts use past forecasts errors and past 
earnings in minimizing their expected loss. Under the linear specification of the loss function, we 
find that positive forecast errors are less costly than negative forecast errors. In fact, in recent 
years, the cost of positive forecast errors is about half as high as the cost of negative forecast 
errors. We simultaneously document inefficient use of information by analysts under this 
                                                                                                                                                             
squared forecast errors rather than absolute forecast errors. Unlike prior studies (Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and 
Markov, 2004), we make no argument about whether quadratic or linear specification is more reasonable. Readers 
who favor one specification are free to disregard evidence obtained under the other. 
2 The econometric approach used in this paper is developed and applied first to macroeconomic forecasts by Ellliott 
et al. (2004a, 2004b). It is described in Section 2. The basic idea of recovering a parameter from the data that is most 
consistent with optimizing behavior and assessing the extent to which optimality restrictions are satisfied in the data 
appears first in Hansen and Singleton’s seminal (1982) study.  
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asymmetric loss function. In particular, we find that analysts do not fully use information in past 
forecast errors and past earnings in minimizing their expected loss.  
In the quadratic specification, we also document the existence of asymmetric incentives. 
The asymmetry is reversed as we find that positive forecast errors are more costly than negative 
forecast errors. However, analysts display similar inefficient use of past forecast errors and past 
earnings information in minimizing their expected loss. The choice between linear and quadratic 
specification is important for making conclusions about analysts’ incentives, but inconsequential 
for making conclusions about analysts’ use of information.  
We also examine whether analysts’ incentives and use of information vary across 
investment firms and over time. We find no evidence that analysts employed by the ten premier 
investment firms that participated in the Global Settlement of 2003 (GS analysts) have more 
asymmetric incentives or use information less efficiently than other analysts (Non-GS analysts). 
If anything, the cost of negative forecast errors in the GS analysts’ loss function tends to slightly 
exceed the cost of negative forecast errors in the non-GS analysts, and GS analysts tend to use 
information more efficiently than non-GS analysts. Our findings offer no support for the 
argument that the GS firms produced more optimistic research due to investment bankers’ 
influence on financial analysts. 
Following Kadan et al. (2004), we partition our sample period of 1985 to 2004 into Pre-
Reg FD (1985-10/2000), Reg FD-GS (10/2000-12/2002), and Post-GS (04/2003-2004) periods. 
The objectives of Regulation FD (Reg FD) and the Global Settlement (GS) is to strengthen 
analysts’ incentives to issue unbiased and accurate forecasts by weakening managers’ (Reg FD) 
and investment bankers’ (GS) influence on analysts. Thus, we expect to observe smaller loss 
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function asymmetry, and perhaps better use of information by analysts in producing their 
earnings forecasts. 
Under the linear loss function representation, the loss function asymmetry is most 
pronounced in the Post-GS period. The cost of positive forecast errors is about 1.5 times as low 
as the cost of negative forecast errors in the Pre-Reg FD (α of about 0.42), and about twice as 
low as the cost of negative forecast errors in the Post-GS period (α of about 0.3). Under the 
quadratic representation we find that the loss function asymmetry is most pronounced in the first 
period. The cost of positive forecast errors is about three times as high as the cost of negative 
forecast errors in the Pre-Reg FD period (α=0.75). In the Post-GS period, the cost of positive 
forecast errors is still higher, but some parameter values are as low as 0.57. In sum, in both 
specifications we document a downward trend in α, which can be attributed to stronger 
incentives to issue lower forecasts. In both specifications and in all time periods we tend to 
document the inefficient use of information. The test statistics in the Post-GS period, however, 
are consistently lower than those in the Pre-Reg FD period, which we interpret as more efficient 
use of information in that period. 
Our empirical analysis has implications for both researchers and policy makers. First, 
what the data reveal about analyst incentives ultimately depends on the model of incentives. Our 
stylized model can be supplanted by richer specifications, grounded in institutional evidence 
about the consequences of making forecast errors or theoretical considerations about the 
optimality of a loss function (Lambert, 2004), to yield novel insights into analyst forecasting 
behavior. Second, designing effective policies to influence the properties of analyst forecasts 
requires some knowledge about the effects of incentives and information use. The general 
approach of recovering financial analysts’ loss function from the data thus can significantly 
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inform the public policy debate about financial analysts’ alleged lack of incentives to issue 
unbiased forecast.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our econometric 
method. Section 3 describes our sample. Empirical analysis is presented in Section 4, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Econometric method 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of our econometric method, which was 
developed by Elliot et al. (2004a, b) to estimate the parameter of a forecaster’s loss function and 
the extent to which the forecaster is successful in minimizing her expected loss. The basic idea of 
recovering a parameter from the data that is most consistent with optimizing behavior and 
assessing the extent to which optimality restrictions are satisfied in the data appears first in 
Hansen and Singleton’s seminal (1982) study.  
 
 
2.1. Representation of analysts’ objectives 
The main features of the model are that larger forecast errors are more costly, and that the 
cost of a forecast error may depend on its sign. In particular, the consequences of making an 
inaccurate forecast are represented by the loss function 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1, , 1 2 1 0 .pt t t tL p A f A fα θ α α θ θ+ + + + ≡ + − ⋅ − < ⋅ −   (1) 
The second term, ( )1 1 pt tA f θ+ +− is the analyst’s forecast error defined as the difference between 
earnings, At+1 and the earnings forecast, ( )1tf θ+ . The latter is a linear function of variables Wt 
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observed by the analyst at time t, ( )1 .t tf Wθ θ+ = ⋅  Different values of θ  represent different 
forecasting rules, which in turn result in different forecast errors. The first term in equation (1), 
( ) ( )( )1 11 2 1 0t tA fα α θ+ + + − ⋅ − <   makes the cost of a forecast error conditional on its sign. If α 
is equal to 0.5, then positive and negative forecast errors are equally costly. In fact, when α=0.50 
and p=1, or 2, the loss function reduces to the familiar cases of a symmetric linear or a quadratic 
loss functions widely used in prior research on financial analysts. If α>0.5, however, then over-
predictions are less costly to the analyst. In other words, the analyst has incentives to over-
predict earnings. In conclusion, our ignorance about the analysts’ objectives consists only of not 
knowing the value of the single parameter α, ( )0,1α ∈ . 
 
2.2. The moment conditions 
As an optimizing agent, the analyst chooses a forecasting rule ( )1t tf Wθ θ+ = ⋅  to 
minimize her expected loss 
 ( )min , ,E L pθ α θ   .  (2) 
If θ  is chosen optimally, then the forecast errors must satisfy the first-order conditions  
 ( )( ) 11 11 0 0pt t tE W ε α ε −∗ ∗+ + ⋅ < − ⋅ =   , (3) 
where 1 1t t tA Wε θ∗ ∗+ += − .3 Having access only to a subset of the information available to the 
analyst at time t, which we denote as Vt, does not prevent us from estimating α. Since an 
optimizing analyst exploits any information available to her at time t, we can substitute Vt for Wt  
                                                 
3 This is proposition 1 in Elliot et al. (2004a). 
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in the moment conditions and use the corresponding sample moments to back out the asymmetry 
parameter α. 
 
2.3. Estimation 
Incentives, as parameterized by a loss function with a single unknown parameter, place 
restrictions on how optimizing analysts use publicly available information, such as past forecast 
errors and past earnings changes. As long as we have more moment conditions than parameters 
to estimate, we are able to recover the asymmetry parameter without ad hoc rationalizing the 
forecasts. The reason for this is that the same α has to set two or more sample moments 
simultaneously to zero. Accordingly, our estimator of α  minimizes a quadratic form  
 ( ) ( )T Tq g Sgα α′=  (4) 
where ( )Tg α  is the sample equivalent of equation (3), and S is a weighting matrix. Our 
weighting matrix is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the moment conditions, which 
minimizes the asymptotic variance of the GMM estimator. 4 In addition, we allow for 
heteroscedasticity and intra-quarter correlation.5 
 
2.4. Test of forecast optimality and relation to prior studies on analysts’ incentives and 
information use 
We use the terms “forecast optimality” and “efficient information use” interchangeably. 
If the analyst’s forecast minimizes her expected loss, then we say that the forecast is optimal 
under the assumed loss function, or that the analyst’s forecast uses efficiently all publicly 
                                                 
4 The weighting matrix determines the relative importance of setting a particular moment condition to zero when 
estimating α. For example, using the identity matrix amounts to treating all moment conditions the same way. 
5 We used Stata’s ivreg2 command and its options cluster and robust for that purpose.  
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available information. Statistically, the distance between the sample moments and zero for such a 
forecast will be very small. Hansen’s J-statistic, which is equal to the minimized value of the 
quadratic form (equation (4)), measures how close to optimality the forecasts are, or 
alternatively, how well the first order conditions are satisfied. It follows a chi-square distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of moments and number of 
parameters estimated.  Large values of the J-statistic result in a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
forecast optimality. 
To appreciate the link between this test of optimality and prior tests of optimality under 
symmetric loss functions, we substitute a known α of 0.5 and p=2 into the moment conditions 
(equation 3), and obtain 
 1 0t tE W ε ∗+ ⋅ =  . (5) 
These moment conditions are the familiar optimality predictions under the symmetric loss 
function that the forecast errors are orthogonal to information known to the analyst. Researchers 
then examine whether they are satisfied by estimating the regression model 
 
1 1 1t o t tVε β β ϖ∗+ += + +  (6) 
and testing the set of restrictions: β0=0 and β1=0. However, if the loss function is not symmetric, 
then we can incorrectly reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis of forecast optimality.6 
At first glance, it may appear that our approach rationalizes analyst forecasts by searching 
over loss functions. Lambert (2004) points out the dangers from undisciplined search for loss 
functions that would make the forecasts appear rational: “It is probably the case that for many 
distributions of analyst forecast errors, we could find some loss function that made them appear 
                                                 
6 The importance of correctly specifying analysts’ loss function for conducting inferences about earnings forecast 
optimality is emphasized in Gu and Wu (2003), Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), Cohen and Lys (2003), Basu and 
Markov (2004), and Lambert (2004). 
 
 9
rational. While changing the weights applied to errors of different size or different signs may 
make them appear “rational”, this does not change the fact that the errors are there.” (p. 220). 
The gist of our approach is, however, not in proposing alternative loss functions, but in 
generalizing the existing ones. The existing loss functions assume a specific parameter value, 
0.5, that is neither supported by empirical evidence, nor derived from theory. We estimate the 
asymmetry parameter based on a set of restrictions derived under the null hypothesis of forecast 
optimality (efficient information use). The only disadvantage in not enforcing symmetry is that it 
reduces the power of our tests to document inefficient information use, if the loss function is 
truly symmetric. Given that we almost always reject the null of efficient information (results are 
discussed in section 4), low power does not appear to be a concern. 
Equation (6) is also the basis for documenting the existence of asymmetric incentives. 
Comparing mean (median) forecast errors of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts is equivalent to 
estimating an OLS (LAD) regression of forecast errors on an indicator variable equal to one, if 
the analyst is affiliated, and zero otherwise. More generally, if the variable itV  (the superscript i 
stands for incentives) is viewed as being only a proxy for incentives, then a non-zero coefficient 
on itV  can be interpreted as evidence that incentives are not constant. There are several 
disadvantages of this approach. First, the documented variation in mean or median forecast 
errors can be driven by variation in how analysts use information. Second, it seems contradictory 
to first assume that analysts are trying to minimize their mean squared error, then test whether a 
difference in mean squared errors exists, and finally attribute the difference in mean squared 
error to difference in incentives. Since we expect incentives to be asymmetric, we can suitably 
parameterize incentives, and then directly estimate the asymmetry parameter. 
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 Chen and Jiang (2004) use a version of equation (6) to explore rational and behavioral 
explanations for why individual analysts’ forecast deviations from the consensus predict 
individual analysts’ earnings forecast error. There are two major differences between their study 
and ours. First, since Chen and Jiang (2004) use equation (6), they only document that individual 
analysts’ incentives are not symmetric without quantifying the amount of asymmetry. More 
importantly, Chen and Jiang’s (2004) evidence speaks to why individual analysts’ earnings 
forecasts deviate from the consensus, while our analysis focuses on the extent to which the 
consensus incorporates publicly available information that is useful for forecasting future 
earnings. 
 
2.5. Variation in asymmetry parameter and forecast optimality 
We estimate a loss function asymmetry parameter and conduct a test of forecast 
optimality across different investment firms and over different time periods. We provide our 
motivation next. 
 
2.5.1. Across investment firms 
In general, the loss function asymmetry stems from analysts’ incentives to: (1) help 
investments bankers bring in revenues (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998), (2) 
retain privileged access to managers’ inside information (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Das et al., 
1998; and Lim, 2001), (3) generate buy trades (Dorfman, 1991; Hayes, 1998; Irvine, 2000), and 
(4) appease investors long in the stock (Bradley et al., 2005). The Global Settlement of 2003 
involves ten investment firms (GS firms, or GS analysts henceforth) with significant amount of 
investment banking operations: Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, 
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Goldman, Sachs & Co., Lehman Brothers Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc., UBS Warburg LLC, and U.S. Bancorp Piper 
Jaffray Inc. 7 The Global Settlement imposed stiff monetary penalties on these firms and required 
structural reforms of investment research that limit communications between investment bankers 
and research analysts, restrict analyst involvement in the IPO process, and forbid any investment 
bankers’ input into analyst evaluation and compensation.8 
Since only ten investment firms were the subject of the enforcement action, it is 
interesting to provide large sample evidence on whether analysts employed at GS firms had 
weaker incentives to issue unbiased and accurate research from analysts employed at non-GS 
firms. An alternative explanation for why these firms were chosen is that it is efficient to 
investigate and settle with the largest providers of investment research.  
 
2.5.2. Over time 
One of the objectives of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), enacted in October 2000, 
is to eliminate the asymmetry in analysts’ loss function that stems from analysts’ reliance on 
managers for information. It bans the disclosure of private information to analysts, thereby 
making it harder for managers to punish/reward analysts by withholding/providing private 
information. Reg FD was followed by increased scrutiny of Wall Street research practices by the 
media and regulators. In the period between Reg FD and the Global Settlement, important events 
that shaped the regulatory environment were: the Securities Industries Association’s publication 
                                                 
7 Regulators participating in The Global Settlement are the SEC, NASD, NYSE, several state attorney generals, and 
the North American Securities Administrators Association. 
8 Information about the terms of settlement, court orders, and other general information is available online at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm. 
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of “Best Practices for Research” and the beginning of Spitzer’s investigations in 2001; the 
proposal and approval by the SEC of amendments to NYSE’s Rule 472 and NASD’s Conduct 
Rule 27119, Spitzer’s settlement with Merrill Lynch, the signing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
additional rule proposals by NYSE and NASD, the proposal of Regulation AC by the SEC, two 
Congressional hearings, and the initial settlement between regulators and major investment 
banks  in 2002; the approval of Regulation AC, the Global Settlement with major investment 
banks, and additional rule making by NYSE and NASD10 in 2003 (see Skiles (2003) for more 
information). The new rules of NYSE and NASD on analysts’ compensation, which are binding 
on all investment firms, similarly ban investment-banking input in analysts’ compensation and 
require that compensation be based on the quality and accuracy of analyst’ research. Thus, we 
expect to observe a general trend toward greater loss function symmetry, and more efficient use 
of information by all analysts. We conduct our analysis for three distinct time periods. Pre-Reg 
FD (1985 through September 2000) is the period before Reg FD became effective. RegFD-GS 
(October 2000 to December 2002) is the period after Reg FD became effective and before the 
terms of the Global Settlement were first announced.  Post-GS (April 2003 to December 2004) is 
the period in which both Reg FD and the Global Settlement are effective. 
 
3. Sample description 
3.1. Variables 
 Our primary data come from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
database. We use the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Estimate History File which contains individual 
analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts for U.S. companies for the period from January 1985 to 
                                                 
9 These rules are described in SEC Release 34-45908. 
10 The amendments to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 are described in SEC Release 34-48252.  
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December 2004. We also use the I/B/E/S Detail History Broker Translation file, which provides 
translations of the BROKER and ANALYST codes in the Detail file to actual investment firm 
and analyst names (if available) to identify GS firms. 
Our analysis uses consensus forecasts constructed from individual analysts’ forecasts. 
There are several motivations for using consensus rather than individual analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. First, there could be random variation in how analysts use information. By using the 
consensus forecast that likely averages out individual analysts’ mistakes, we can better 
understand the incentives operating on financial analysts as a group, as well as the extent to 
which their forecasts incorporate available information. Second, our objective is to describe the 
common component of individual analysts’ loss functions. This component could be induced by 
employment at the same investment firm, or by employment at investment firms that follow 
similar compensation policies, or are subject to the same regulations.  
 We denote the quarterly I/B/E/S earnings per share (EPS) for quarter 1t +  as 1tA + , and the 
consensus forecast of 1tA +  as 
1t
tF
+ . The consensus is defined as the median of the first available 
individual analyst forecasts issued after the announcement of tA . We exclude forecasts issued in 
the second half of the period between earnings announcements tA and 1tA + . These forecasts are 
likely to be more efficient with respect to information available at time t simply because some of 
the information arriving during the quarter is likely to confirm what is known but ignored by 
analysts at time t (Soffer and Lys, 1999). The forecast error 1ttFE
+  is defined as 1tA + - 
1t
tF
+ , and 
1( )t tA A −−  is the earnings change in the quarterly I/B/E/S EPS for the quarter t. All variables are 
scaled by the share price recorded for the earnings-announcement month of the quarter t-1 
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obtained from IBES to alleviate heteroscedasticity concerns and are winsorized at the 1% level 
on both tails to eliminate outliers.  
In addition to constructing a consensus forecast that includes forecasts issued by all 
investment firm, All firms consensus forecast, we construct both a GS consensus forecast and a 
non-GS consensus forecast. The former (the latter) includes only forecasts issued by analysts 
employed at GS (non-GS) investment firms. Our motivation is to assess differences in loss 
function asymmetry and use of information between GS and non-GS firms.  
As changes in the regulatory environment may change analysts’ incentives and how they 
use information in producing their forecasts, we examine the properties of these different types 
of consensus forecasts for three distinct time periods: Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-GS, and Post-GS. 
More details about the sample construction are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample. Panel A of Table 1 provides 
information about investment firm size as measured by number of analysts employed. We 
determine the number of analysts employed by a given investment firm in a given year based on 
the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Estimate History File. We then average over calendar years and 
investment firms to calculate mean, median, standard deviation, and 25th and 75th quantiles of the 
distribution of number of analysts employed by GS firms and non-GS firms over the three time 
periods. 
The mean number of analysts employed by a GS firm is about 65, 127, and 108 in the 
Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-GS, and Post-GS periods. The corresponding statistics for a non-GS firm 
are 7, 12, and 9. Thus, the distribution of firm size appears to be highly skewed with the GS 
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firms being the largest employers. From a regulator’s perspective, it could be efficient to 
investigate and settle with the few investment firms that employ the largest number of analysts. 
The drop in analyst employment from Reg FD-GS period to Post-GS period is perhaps 
due to the lower value from employing analysts induced by the ban on analyst participation in 
investment banking deals. At the same time, untabulated results show an increase in the number 
of non-GS firms from Reg FD-GS to Post-GS period. This could be in response to stronger 
demand for alternative sources of investment research due to perception of tainted research at the 
GS firms and new regulatory requirement that GS firms make available third party research to 
their customers.   
Panel B provides descriptive statistics about the number of forecasts included in the All 
firms, GS and non-GS consensus forecasts over the three time periods. The mean number of 
forecasts included in the GS (non-GS) consensus forecasts in the Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-GS, and 
Post-GS periods is about 2.4 (4), 3.2 (5.1), and 3.3 (6). In general, the greater the number of 
forecasts included in the consensus, the more likely that individual analyst mistakes average out. 
Whether the difference in number of forecasts included in the GS and non-GS consensus will 
translate into difference in consensus forecast optimality is an empirical question. 
 Panels C report descriptive statistics on the variables used in our statistical analysts; 
consensus forecasts, consensus forecast errors, actual EPS, and past earnings change ( 1ttF
+ , 
1t
tFE
+ , 1tA +  and 1( )t tA A −− ). We document that mean forecast errors are consistently negative 
and median forecast errors are consistently positive. Both mean and median forecast errors 
exhibit an upward trend. Median (mean) forecast errors are 0, 0.0003, and 0.0005 (-0.0022, -
0.0011, -0.0007) in the Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-GS, and Post-GS periods.  
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The traditional approach to drawing conclusions about analysts’ incentives is to 
hypothesize a difference in incentives, and then test for differences in mean or median forecast 
errors. Consider the evidence in Table 1 that median forecast errors for all firms is zero in the 
Pre-Reg FD period, 0.0003 in the Reg FD-GS period, and 0.0005 in the Post-GS period. The 
interpretation, based on the traditional approach, would be that analysts have stronger incentives 
to issue pessimistic forecasts in later periods. The limitations of this approach are obvious. First, 
incentives are not quantified as they are not formally modeled. More importantly, forecast errors 
are viewed as being informative only about incentives, but not about how analysts use 
information. In principle, a combination of asymmetric incentives and inefficient use of 
information can result in a zero median forecast error.  
 
 
4.1 Empirical evidence on loss function asymmetry and analysts’ use of information for 
quadratic and linear and linear specifications 
4.1. Linear specification 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 report the results from our estimations under the linear 
representation of the loss function for three separate time periods; Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-GS, and 
Post-Reg FD. We report asymmetry parameter, αl and J-statistic for All firms, GS firms, and non-
GS firms. We use four different sets of instruments: vector of one; vector of one and past forecast 
errors; vector of one and past earnings changes; and vector of one, earnings at lag one and two, 
and a forecast of earnings at lag one. These information items are known to the analysts as our 
consensus incorporates only forecasts issued after the announcement of past quarter’s earnings.  
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Before we discuss the evidence in Table 2, consider first the evidence in Panel C of Table 
1 that median forecast errors for all firms are 0 in the Pre-Reg FD period, 0.0003 in the Reg FD-
GS period, and 0.0005 in the Post-GS period. Using the traditional approach we concluded that 
analysts have stronger incentives to issue pessimistic forecasts in later periods. Our estimation 
with a single instrument improves over the traditional approach in that it provides an empirical 
measure of asymmetric incentives and of how they changed during the period. In particular, the 
cost of positive forecast error decreased from 0.41 in the Pre-Reg FD period to 0.30 in the Post-
GS period (reported in the first row of Panels A and C, Table 2). This alternative approach, 
however, still assumes that the properties of the forecast error distribution are reflective only of 
analysts’ incentives. If analysts do not use information efficiently, then it is possible that the true 
cost of a positive forecast error is different from our estimate of 0.41.  
Our estimations that use more than one instrument overcome this limitation by effectively 
considering additional information that may have been used inefficiently and thus may account 
for our findings of αl equal to 0.41. Our econometric approach selects a single parameter value 
that sets all sample moment conditions as close to zero as possible and then evaluates the 
distance between the moment conditions and zero. After adding past forecast errors as an 
additional instrument, in the period Pre-Reg FD we document a slightly higher αl of 0.43, and 
that the distance between zero and the sample moment conditions is “too” large; for this case, the 
J-statistic is 53.21 (Panel A, Table 2). Any concern that relaxing the symmetry assumption may 
compromise our ability to detect inefficient use of information is not justified as we reject the 
null hypothesis of forecast optimality in the period Pre-Reg FD. Thus, we are able to document 
two distinct phenomena: (1) analysts have asymmetric loss function and (2) their forecasts do not 
incorporate all available information in minimizing their expected loss. In the rest of this section, 
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we discuss our findings based on this approach; we use more than one instrument to 
simultaneously estimate the loss function parameter and test for forecast optimality.  
In the Pre-Reg FD period, we document an αl of 0.42 while in the Reg FD-GS and Post-
GS period we document an αl of 0.32 and 0.30 (reported in Panels A,B and C of Table 2). In 
other words, the cost of a positive forecast error is about 1.5 times as low as the cost of a 
negative forecast error, and more than twice as low as the cost of a negative forecast error in the 
Reg FD-GS and Post-GS periods. At the same time, we document a trend toward more efficient 
information use. The J-statistics are consistently lower in the Post-GS period than in the Pre-Reg 
FD period, and we do not always reject the null hypothesis of efficient information use. In 
conclusion, we document the co-existence of asymmetric incentives and inefficient information 
use.  
We do not find significant differences in αl between GS and non-GS firms in any period. 
The maximum difference is observed in the Post-GS period when non-GS firms’ αl exceeds that 
of GS firms’ by 0.03 or 0.04 (Panel C, Table 2), depending on the instruments we use. However, 
we reject the hypothesis of equal loss functions most of the times. The documented higher cost 
of making positive forecast errors for analysts employed by non-GS firms suggests that they 
have stronger incentives to issue higher forecasts than analysts employed at GS firm.  
In general, both GS and non-GS analysts fail to extract all information in past forecast 
errors and earnings to minimize their expected loss. The J-stat for GS analysts, however, tends to 
be lower than the J-stat for non-GS analysts, and in one case we fail to reject the null of efficient 
use of information by GS analysts while still rejecting the same null for non-GS analysts.  
 
4.2. Quadratic specification 
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 The evidence presented in Table 3 is generated under the assumption of quadratic loss 
function. As we discuss our results, we will contrast our conclusions about analysts’ incentives 
and forecast optimality under alternative loss function assumptions. Until evidence to 
unambiguously validate one assumption is provided, it is worthwhile to study analysts’ 
incentives and analysts’ use of information under alternate assumptions. 
 In the quadratic specification, we find strong evidence that positive forecast errors are 
more costly than negative forecast errors. For example, the loss function asymmetry parameter, 
denoted as αq, ranges between 0.70 and 0.78 in the Pre-Reg FD period, 0.58 and 0.69 in the Reg 
FD-GS period, and 0.58 and 0.75 in the Post-GS period (Panels A, B and C of Table 3). This 
contradicts our findings under the linear specification that α is less than 0.5 (Panels A, B and C, 
Table 2). The contradictory findings about α, or the relative costs of positive and negative 
forecast errors, echo the similarly contradictory findings about positive median forecast errors 
and negative mean forecast errors (Table 1, Panel C). Our findings on how analysts use 
information under the quadratic loss function, however, agree with our findings under the linear 
loss function. We reject the null hypothesis of forecast optimality in all time periods. 
Conclusions about how analysts use information do not appear to depend on how we specify the 
loss function.  
Just like in the linear representation, we find evidence that GS analysts’ loss function 
differs only slightly from that of non-GS analysts. Their cost of making positive forecast errors, 
while still greater than 0.5, is lower than that of non-GS analysts, which means that non-GS 
analysts have stronger incentives to issue optimistic forecasts. Furthermore, in the Reg FD-GS 
period and in the Post-GS period, we often fail to reject the null hypothesis of loss function 
symmetry for GS brokers, while we always reject the null hypothesis of symmetry for non-GS 
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brokers. This evidence suggests that GS analysts’ loss function is closer to being symmetric. At 
the same time, we caution our readers against concluding that regulators targeted the GS brokers 
only because of their large pockets and visibility. The issues of how much information investors 
had about GS and non-GS analysts’ incentives and how much investors relied on analyst reports 
published by GS and non-GS analysts when making investment decisions, while undoubtedly 
important for formulating regulatory policies, are not addressed in this study.  
The stylized facts emerging from our analysis are as follows. Financial analysts’ loss 
function is asymmetric, and analysts do not fully use past earnings and forecast errors 
information to minimize their expected loss. In the linear specification, we find that positive 
forecast errors are less costly than negative forecast errors (α is less than 0.5), while in the 
quadratic specification, we find that positive forecast errors are more costly (α is greater than 
0.5). Under either specification we find that GS analysts tend to have a lower α, which can be 
interpreted as stronger incentives to issue lower forecasts. Finally, under either specification we 
document a downward trend in α. 
Our results are robust to using alternative definitions of consensus forecast and 
alternative deflator variables. In particular, the results do not change when we use the mean of 
individual analyst forecasts as a measure of consensus or when we scale all variables by price at 
time t-1 rather than t-2, or by total assets at time t-2. Excluding observations for which price is 
less than $1 had no effect on our findings. 
 We conducted the same analysis for forecasts issued in the second half of the quarter. We 
find that the cost of positive forecast errors is even lower, and that some, but not all, findings of 
inefficient information use disappears. Overall, we are still able to document two distinct 
phenomena. 
 21
 
5. Conclusions 
Financial analysts’ consensus earnings forecast errors have been extensively studied from 
two diametric perspectives. The first one emphasizes the effect of incentives but pays little 
attention to the issue of how well analysts use information in responding to these incentives. The 
second one focuses on how analysts use information with little attention to the effect of 
incentives on forecast errors. Adopting one of two perspectives is unnecessary, and limits our 
understanding of financial analysts’ forecasting behavior because both incentives and cognitive 
biases are likely to simultaneously affect the properties of analysts’ forecast errors.  
The most distinctive feature of our empirical analysis of quarterly earnings forecast errors 
is that it combines the two perspectives.11 We are able to simultaneously document that analysts’ 
incentives are asymmetric and that analysts do not use information efficiently in minimizing 
their expected loss. In the linear specification, we find that positive forecast errors are less costly 
than positive forecast errors (α<0.5). This finding is reversed in the quadratic specification in 
which we document a higher cost of positive forecast errors (α>0.5). The reversal in asymmetry 
suggests that the choice of specification matters for our inferences about analysts’ incentives and 
that more research on how accuracy is measured and rewarded is needed.  
We also examine whether analysts’ incentives and use of information vary across 
brokerages and over time. We find no evidence to support the argument that analysts employed 
by firms that participated in the Global Settlement of 2003 issued more biased research as a 
result of investment-banking considerations. It is possible, however, that our tests have low 
                                                 
11 In other words, we view the forecast as a choice that analysts make in trying to enhance their welfare--a departure 
from the literature’s tradition of viewing forecasts as exogenously given (Demski, 2004). In a survey of the use of 
expectations in accounting research, Demski forcefully argues that reliance on exogenous expectations structures 
limits the depth and boundaries of teaching and research (p. 519). 
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power. Perhaps, differences in incentives are more likely to manifest themselves in annual 
earnings and recommendations (Kadan et al., 2004). A natural extension of our analysis would 
be to examine the loss function implicit in analysts’ long-term annual and quarterly earnings 
forecasts. 
We find that over time the cost of making positive forecast errors (α) goes down, and that 
analysts appear to use information more efficiently. Due to competitive and regulatory pressures, 
the market of investment research seems to have evolved toward greater information efficiency. 
Whether users benefit from the decrease (increase) in the cost of positive (negative) errors is 
unclear since under the linear loss function, the decrease in the cost of positive forecast errors 
means even greater loss function asymmetry.   
In this study, we consider only a few information variables suggested by prior research as 
being inefficiently used by financial analysts. The econometric approach of separating the effects 
of incentives from the effects of inefficient use of information can be applied to other 
information variables such as extreme past earnings (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), accruals 
(Bradshaw et al., 2001), and past returns (Lys and Sohn, 1990). Another potential venue for 
future research would be to conduct a similar analysis of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Understanding the forecasting behavior of individual analysts is essential for understanding how 
the market for investment research functions. 
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Appendix 1 Sample construction details 
 
  Number of forecasts  
 
 All firms  GS firms  Non-GS 
firms 
 
Number of forecasts 872,857  278,024  594,833   
Less: 
Outside Pre-Reg FD, Reg FD-
GS, and Post-GS periods (17,181)  (5,665)  (11,516)  
   855,676  272,359  583,317   
 Not the first available (84,704)  (27,303)  (57,401)  
Remaining number of forecasts 770,972  245,056  525,916   
 Number of analysts 10,906  3,349  8,622   
 Number of investment firms 605  11  594   
        
Number of consensus forecasts 194,892  108,720  173,194   
Less Missing price, lagged earnings 
and lagged forecasts (36,362)  (22,602)  (36,556)  
Remaining consensus forecasts 158,530  86,118  136,638   
        
Period 1 (Pre-Reg FD)        
 Remaining consensus forecasts 119,829  65,172  103,131   
Period 2 (RegFD-GS)       
 Remaining consensus forecasts 22,776  12,893 19,448   
Period 3 (Post-GS)       
 Remaining consensus forecasts 15,925  8,053 14,059   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
1tA + is the quarterly IBES EPS for the quarter 1t + . 1ttF +  is the median consensus EPS forecast of 1tA +  
constructed from forecasts issued in the first half of the interval between the announcement of tA  and 1tA + . 
1t
tFE
+  is the corresponding forecast error for the quarter 1t + . 1( )t tA A −−  is the earnings change in the 
quarterly IBES EPS for the quarter t. All variables are scaled by share price recorded for the earnings 
announcement month of quarter t-1 obtained from IBES. Mean, standard deviation, median 1st and 3rd 
quartiles of the variables are reported. Variables are generated from the median consensus of all available 
quarterly forecasts (All firms), consensus of only global settlement investment firm analysts’ quarterly 
forecasts (GS firms) and consensus of all non-settlement investment firm analysts’ quarterly forecasts (non-
GS firms). Within each classification, we also split the data across three different periods: (1) Pre-Reg FD: 
1985-September 2000; (2) Reg FD–GS: October 2000-December 2002; (3) Post-GS: April 2003-December 
2004. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level on both tails. The sample period is 1985 – 2004. Only 
observations without missing 1ttF
+ , 1ttFE
+ , 1tA +  and 1( )t tA A −−  are used in the analysis. 
 
Panel A. Number of analysts employed and companies covered 
 
 Mean SD 0.25 Median 0.75 
Companies 
covered 
Pre-RegFD     
 GS firms 64.74 29.52 48.68 64.89 75.73 1701.94 
 Non-GS firms 6.94 10.23 1.31 3.50 8.00 2581.88 
        
Reg FD-GS12       
 GS firms 126.90 55.78 108.75 129.00 161.63 2216.00 
 Non-GS firms 11.92 17.25 2.00 5.00 14.50 3260.00 
        
Post-GS       
 GS firms 108.28 18.72 94.50 111.50 116.50 1803.00 
 Non-GS firms 9.39 14.64 1.50 3.50 11.75 3022.00 
                                                 
12 Note that the statistics presented in this table do not include the period from Oct 2000 to Dec 2000. The statistics on 
the calendar year 2000 are included in the period Pre-RegFD. For the period Post-GS, the year 2003 is included.  
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Panel B. Number of forecasts included in the consensus forecast and number of companies covered 
 
 Mean S.D. 0.25 Median 0.75 
Pre-Reg FD      
 All firms 5.274 4.038 2 4 7 
 GS firms 2.397 1.410 1 2 3 
 Non-GS firms 3.938 3.021 2 3 5 
Reg FD-GS      
 All firms 7.204 5.481 3 6 10 
 GS firms 3.198 1.866 2 3 4 
 Non-GS firms 5.146 3.988 2 4 7 
Post-GS      
 All firms 7.966 6.108 3 6 11 
 GS firms 3.290 1.903 2 3 4 
 Non-GS firms 5.925 4.575 3 5 8 
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Panel C. Descriptive statistics of variables  
 
  All firms consensus  GS firms forecast  Non-GS firms forecast 
  Mean SD 0.25 Median 0.75  Mean SD 0.25 Median 0.75  Mean SD 0.25 Median 0.75 
Pre-Reg FD             
1t
tF
+  0.0128 0.0199 0.0079 0.0147 0.0218  0.0141 0.0174 0.0090 0.0152 0.0219  0.0130 0.0188 0.0080 0.0147 0.0216 
1t
tFE
+  -0.0022 0.0141 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0016  -0.0012 0.0110 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0015  -0.0019 0.0124 -0.0019 0.0000 0.0016 
1tA +  0.0104 0.0269 0.0065 0.0142 0.0218  0.0127 0.0226 0.0083 0.0149 0.0221  0.0109 0.0248 0.0068 0.0142 0.0216 
1( )t tA A −−  0.0006 0.0220 -0.0036 0.0006 0.0043  0.0004 0.0185 -0.0030 0.0006 0.0038  0.0005 0.0201 -0.0034 0.0006 0.0041 
N= 119,829      65,172     103,131    
                 
Reg FD-GS               
1t
tF
+  0.0029 0.0282 -0.0020 0.0087 0.0178  0.0037 0.0251 0.0000 0.0085 0.0165  0.0042 0.0256 -0.0006 0.0089 0.0179 
1t
tFE
+  -0.0011 0.0135 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0018  -0.0002 0.0103 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0016  -0.0009 0.0118 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0017 
1tA +  0.0013 0.0344 -0.0034 0.0086 0.0180  0.0030 0.0296 -0.0007 0.0086 0.0169  0.0028 0.0308 -0.0019 0.0088 0.0181 
1( )t tA A −−  0.0009 0.0220 -0.0034 0.0004 0.0037  0.0006 0.0189 -0.0031 0.0004 0.0032  0.0005 0.0194 -0.0032 0.0004 0.0034 
N= 22,776      12,893    19,448     
                 
Post-GS                
1t
tF
+  0.0068 0.0259 0.0036 0.0118 0.0186  0.0085 0.0229 0.0052 0.0120 0.0187  0.0070 0.0244 0.0038 0.0118 0.0183 
1t
tFE
+  -0.0007 0.0136 -0.0006 0.0005 0.0024  -0.0002 0.0112 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0021  -0.0004 0.0121 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0023 
1tA +  0.0059 0.0315 0.0038 0.0123 0.0193  0.0083 0.0266 0.0055 0.0125 0.0195  0.0063 0.0290 0.0040 0.0122 0.0191 
1( )t tA A −−  0.0016 0.0221 -0.0028 0.0006 0.0046  0.0010 0.0188 -0.0025 0.0006 0.0039  0.0014 0.0200 -0.0027 0.0006 0.0044 
N= 15,925    8,053   14,059  
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Table 2. Estimation of alphas and J-statistics using a linear loss function  
We estimate α from the FOC: ( )( ) 01 11 0 0t t tE V FE FEα∗ ∗+ + ⋅ < − ⋅ =    using the two-step efficient Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM). Vt is a vector of instrument, and FE is the forecast error, as defined in Table 1. 
α=0.5 represents the case of loss function symmetry. α>0.5 represents the case of analysts’ incentives to 
issue optimistic forecasts. α<0.5 represents the case of analysts’ incentives to issue pessimistic forecasts. 
The reported Hansen’s J-statistic13 measures how close to optimality the forecasts are (Elliott et al., 2004a, 
b). It has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of 
moments and number of parameter estimated. Large values of the J-statistic result in a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of forecast optimality. We report α and J-statistics for All firms, GS firms, and Non-GS firms 
over three time periods: (1) Pre-Reg FD: 1985-September 2000; (2) Reg FD–GS: October 2000-December 
2002; (3) Post-GS: April 2003-December 2004.. In parentheses are robust standard errors for α and p-value 
for J-statistics. We allow for heteroscedasticity and intra-quarter correlation. The last column reports the 
difference in α between GS firms and Non-GS firms. The reported p-value, in parenthesis, is from the test of 
the hypothesis that the difference is zero. The test statistic is calculated as 
2( ) /[var( ) var( )]Non GS GS Non GS GSα α α α− −− + . It follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom 1. α’s not 
significantly different from 0.5 at the 1% level are in bold. 
 
Panel A: Pre-Reg FD period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.411   0.385   0.412   0.027  
 (0.012)    (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.130)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant     
 0.428 53.212  0.418 31.199  0.443 34.196  0.025  
 (0.012)  (0.000)   (0.012) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.000)   (0.122)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.422 35.569  0.388 27.411  0.426 37.337  0.038  
 (0.012)  (0.000)   (0.013) (0.000)  (0.012) (0.000)   (0.035)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant  
 0.425 52.956  0.404 44.478  0.437 45.209  0.033  
 (0.011)  (0.000)   (0.011) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.000)   (0.031)  
            
 
 
                                                 
13 The Hansen’s J-statistic is equal to the minimized value of J=Ngt(α)´Sgt(α), where N is the sample size, gt(α) is the first order 
condition, E[Vt(FEt+1<0)- α)|FEt+1|p-1]=0,  and S is the optimal weighting matrix (see Section 2.3). In STATA we use ivreg2 with 
the gmm option which utilizes the two-step efficient GMM, and the optimal weighting matrix is the inverse of the covariance matrix 
of orthogonality conditions. Note that there should be at least two instruments to be able to estimate this statistic. 
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Panel B: Reg FD-GS period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.325   0.284   0.321   0.037  
 (0.015)    (0.011)   (0.014)   (0.031)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant    
 0.318 9.070  0.284 7.545  0.328 8.744  0.044  
 (0.015)  (0.003)   (0.011) (0.006)  (0.014) (0.003)   (0.012)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.313 6.822  0.283 4.163  0.306 7.395  0.023  
 (0.014)  (0.009)   (0.011) (0.041)  (0.013) (0.007)   (0.165)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant    
 0.323 9.394  0.289 7.706  0.321 9.440  0.032  
 (0.010)  (0.024)   (0.009) (0.053)  (0.007) (0.024)   (0.004)  
            
 
 
Panel C: Post-GS period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.298   0.265   0.293   0.028  
 (0.007)    (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.026)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant    
 0.312 13.452  0.271 8.529  0.306 8.410  0.035  
 (0.006)  (0.000)   (0.010) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.004)   (0.003)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.300 1.635  0.269 2.405  0.297 3.153  0.028  
 (0.007)  (0.201)   (0.010) (0.121)  (0.008) (0.076)   (0.022)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant    
 0.301 22.545  0.267 9.496  0.304 9.675  0.037  
 (0.005)  (0.000)   (0.005) (0.023)  (0.006) (0.022)   (0.000)  
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Table 3. Estimation of alphas and J-statistics using a quadratic loss function 
We estimate α from the FOC: ( )( ) 11 11 0 0t t tE V FE FEα∗ ∗+ + ⋅ < − ⋅ =    using the two-step efficient Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM). Vt is a vector of instrument, and FE is the forecast error, as defined in Table 1. 
α=0.5 represents the case of loss function symmetry. α>0.5 represents the case of analysts’ incentives to 
issue optimistic forecasts. α<0.5 represents the case of analysts’ incentives to issue pessimistic forecasts. 
The reported Hansen’s J-statistic measures how close to optimality the forecasts are (Elliott et al., 2004a, b). 
It has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of 
moments and number of parameter estimated. Large values of the J-statistic result in a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of forecast optimality. We report α and J-statistics for All firms, GS firms, and Non-GS firms over 
three time periods: (1) Pre-Reg FD: 1985-September 2000; (2) Reg FD–GS: October 2000-December 2002; 
(3) Post-GS: April 2003-December 2004. In parentheses are robust standard errors for α and p-value for J-
statistics. We allow for heteroscedasticity and intra-quarter correlation. The last column reports the 
difference in α between GS brokers and Non-GS brokers. The reported p-value, in parenthesis, is from the 
test of the hypothesis that the difference is zero. The test statistic is calculated as 
2( ) /[var( ) var( )]Non GS GS Non GS GSα α α α− −− + . It follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom 1. α’s not 
significantly different from 0.5 at the 1% level are in bold. 
 
Panel A: Pre-Reg FD period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.685   0.635   0.674   0.039  
 (0.010)    (0.013)   (0.010)   (0.013)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant     
 0.778 50.215  0.663 32.556  0.707 35.397  0.043  
 (0.008)  (0.000)   (0.012) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.000)   (0.003)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.694 22.667  0.636 15.457  0.686 29.060  0.050  
 (0.009)  (0.000)   (0.012) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.000)   (0.001)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant  
 0.762 50.650  0.686 45.654  0.720 48.284  0.034  
 (0.008)  (0.000)   (0.011) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.000)   (0.014)  
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Panel B: Reg FD-GS period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.599   0.525   0.591   0.066  
 (0.021)    (0.023)   (0.019)   (0.025)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant    
 0.686 9.226  0.574 7.577  0.635 7.915  0.060  
 (0.023)  (0.002)   (0.029) (0.006)  (0.023) (0.005)   (0.107)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.576 6.131  0.517 3.758  0.566 5.777  0.049  
 (0.019)  (0.013)   (0.022) (0.053)  (0.016) (0.016)   (0.070)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant    
 0.649 9.408  0.542 7.477  0.641 8.536  0.099  
 (0.023)  (0.024)   (0.027) (0.058)  (0.017) (0.036)   (0.002)  
        
 
 
 Panel C: Post-GS period 
 
 All Firms  GS Firms  Non-GS Firms  
 alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  alpha J-stat  Non GS GSα α− −
Instruments : Constant only       
 0.557   0.520   0.541   0.021  
 (0.022)    (0.031)   (0.022)   (0.572)  
            
Instruments: Past forecast error and constant    
 0.753 11.818  0.626 8.024  0.663 8.998  0.036  
 (0.027)  (0.001)   (0.042) (0.005)  (0.018) (0.003)   (0.421)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings change and constant    
 0.576 3.604  0.527 1.359  0.570 5.687  0.043  
 (0.018)  (0.058)   (0.029) (0.244)  (0.016) (0.017)   (0.199)  
            
Instruments: Past earnings at lags 1and 2, past forecast error at lag 1 and constant    
 0.668 18.007  0.605 9.392  0.648 10.381  0.043  
 (0.016)  (0.000)   (0.027) (0.025)  (0.016) (0.016)   (0.169)  
            
 
